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Abstract
This Essay focuses on four areas of international human rights law. The first area, the pro-
tection of attorneys’ fees from forfeiture, is an issue of great concern in the United States, given
the state of the law there. The next area, the application of the death penalty in international law,
will also include arguments about the “death row phenomenon.” The third area addressed is the
use of international human rights law to overcome the rule of non-inquiry in extradition matters,
a rule by which the judicial authority reviewing the propriety of extradition is barred from inquiry
into the fairness of judicial procedures, prison conditions, or other potential issues of mistreatment
in the requesting country at any stage in the proceedings. The final area, the use of abduction by
government officials or their paid patrons as a means to bring suspects within a court’s jurisdiction
for criminal prosecution, is a process used by governments including the United States in lieu of
extradition.
USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW AND MACHINERY IN DEFENDING
BORDERLESS CRIME CASES
Richardj Wilson*
INTRODUCTION
Practitioners of criminal law in Europe are already well
aware of the impact, both real and potential, of international
human rights law in the prosecution and defense of criminal
cases. The European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms' ("European Convention on Human Rights")
has already had a major impact on the national practice of crimi-
nal law among the various European Union, ("EU") Member
States. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said for the United
States, which has staunchly refused to make itself a party to any
international human rights instrument which might subject it to
review of allegations of individual violations of human rights,
whether in the criminal process or any other.
Despite a refusal to participate fully in the review of its own
human rights record in individual cases, however, the United
States has shown some willingness to participate in the interna-
tional regime of human rights, having ratified, in the past several
years, the Convention Against Torture3 ("Torture Convention"),
* Professor of Law and Director of the International Human Rights Law Clinic at
the American University, Washington. J.D., University of Illinois, 1972. Prof. Wilson
originally presented this piece to the Conference on Borderless Crimes and Criminal
Organizations of May 24-27, 1996, in Dublin, Ireland.
1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European Convention].
2. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. A, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179 -II) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L
169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987)). Until 1995, the twelve European
Union ("EU") Member States were Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Spain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United King-
dom. TEU, supra, pmbl., O.J. C 224/1, at 2 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 725-26. On
January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland and Sweden became EU Member States. The European
Commission: The Week in Europe - Week Ending 31 May 1996, M2 PR..SSWlRE, June 7,
1996, available in WESTLAW, Allnewsplus Database.
3. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
1606
DEFENDING BORDERLESS CRIME CASES
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights4
("ICCPR"), and the International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of Racial Discrimination 5 ("Race Convention").
It is something of a struggle to find common ground from
the diverse human rights experiences of the United States and
the Continent. For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume
some, though minimal, knowledge of international and general
human rights law. Moreover, while I shall attempt to include
European examples where possible, as my knowledge of human
rights issues comes mostly from U.S. experiences, I will address
the issues presented largely from a U.S. perspective.
This paper comes directly out of my experience of having
used international human rights law as a defense attorney in ac-
tual criminal cases handled by the International Human Rights
Law Clinic at the law school of the American University, in Wash-
ington, D.C. As the director of the Clinic, I select cases appro-
priate for our students to handle as part of their student prac-
tice. Students working in teams then, under my close supervi-
sion, perform all work and make all judgments as to the
direction of the litigation. I will focus on four areas of interna-
tional human rights law, all but the first of which have come up
in litigation handled by the Clinic. In examining these areas, I
will discuss the clinic litigation involved and, if necessary, give a
more general analysis of the issues presented. The first area, the
protection of attorneys' fees from forfeiture, is an issue of great
concern in the United States, given the state of the law there.
The next area, the application of the death penalty in interna-
tional law, will also include arguments about the "death row phe-
nomenon."6 The third area addressed is the use of international
human rights law to overcome the rule of non-inquiry in extradi-
ment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (1984), 1991 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. 107 (Cm. 1775) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
4. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 18, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, 178, 1977 Gr. Brit T.S. No. 6 (Cmnd. 6702), at 11 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
5. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 5 I.L.M. 352 (entered into
forceJan. 4, 1969).
6. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 28 I.L.M.
1063 (1989) (holding that "death row phenomenon" of prolonged delay awaiting execu-
tion under difficult conditions of confinement violated international human rights
law).
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tion matters,7 a rule by which the judicial authority reviewing the
propriety of extradition is barred from inquiry into the fairness
of judicial procedures, prison conditions, or other potential is-
sues of mistreatment in the requesting country at any stage in
the proceedings.8 This rule is applied in both the United States
and in many of the Commonwealth countries.9 The final area,
the use of abduction by government officials or their paid pa-
trons as a means to bring suspects within a court's jurisdiction
for criminal prosecution, is a process used by governments in-
cluding the United States in lieu of extradition. This process was
approved by the United States Supreme Court, in the absence of
an explicit prohibition in the relevant extradition treaty."
In discussing each of these areas, I will focus on the use of
international human rights law primarily as it might be inter-
preted in international venues, such as those of the European or
Inter-American systems for human rights protection, 1 the two
regional mechanisms for the enforcement of human rights.
Some mention will also be made of the United Nations Human
Rights Committee, 12 which operates under the Optional Proto-
col"8 to the ICCPR, whose jurisprudence is becoming increas-
ingly important for analysis of international human rights issues,
and which provides another locus of political pressure for gov-
ernmental compliance with international norms.
7. See Michael P. Shea, Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition
Cases After Soering, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 85, 93 (1992) (defining rule of non-inquiry as
blocking ofjudicial inquiry into fairness ofjudicial procedures and penal conditions of
requesting country in traditional extradition process).
8. Id.
9. Id. at n.13.
10. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992) (holding that
forcible abduction of foreign national into United States does not deprive U.S. criminal
courts of jurisdiction, and does not violate extradition treaty which fails to explicitly
prohibit such acts).
11. Bruce Zagaris, International Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Can International
Law Truly Effect Global Political and Economic Stability? Constructing a Hemispheric Initiative
Against Transnational Crime, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1888, 1896 (1996) (discussing such
Inter-American systems for human rights as Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights and Inter-American Court for Human Rights).
12. ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 28, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, 6 I.L.M. at 376. Eighteen
members, chosen for their moral character and competence in human rights, comprise
the United Nations Human Rights Committee. Id.
13. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 383 (1967).
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I. PROTECTING ATTORNEYS' FEES FROM FORFEITURE USING
INTERNA TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Knowing the issue of protecting attorneys' fees from forfei-
ture is near and dear to the hearts of all criminal defense law-
yers, I shall begin here. It certainly is an issue of current interest
to defense lawyers in the United States, where F. Lee Bailey, the
well-known criminal defense attorney, became the latest in a
string of casualties in a battle over forfeiture of attorneys' fees.' 4
Bailey was jailed for contempt of court for more than a month
when he refused to surrender nearly US$17 million in cash and
stock which he said was a legitimate fee paid by a private client,
but which a federal trial court judge in Gainesville, Florida said
was the proceeds of criminal activity subject to forfeiture under
federal law after Bailey's client, Claude Duboc, had pleaded
guilty.' 5 Although he eventually surrendered the stock to gain
his release, Bailey vowed that he would settle the issue by litiga-
tion. 6
Bailey's jailing, and the ongoing conflicts over whether at-
torneys' fees should be subject to seizure at all, arise out of an
interpretation of federal statutory law by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 17 In 1989, the court narrowly held in twin 5-4 decisions"
that defense attorneys' fees are subject to forfeiture under fed-
eral statutes which permit pre-trial seizure of assets of the ac-
14. See F.'Lee Bailey Freed From Jail in Dispute Over Drug Money, N.Y. TIMEs, April 20,
1996, at A12 [hereinafter F. Lee Bailey Freed From Jail] (discussing U.S. Federal Court
sending Mr. Bailey to Federal Detention Center after missing court-imposed deadline
to turn over stock and money that had belonged to his client whom Government
claimed had obtained stock and money illegally). A similar dispute during the 1990
trial of deposed Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega led me to write an extended
article on the international implications of the seizure of attorneys' fees, from which
much of the material in this section is taken. See RichardJ. Wilson, Human Rights and
Money Laundering: The Prospect of International Seizure of Defense Attorney Fees, 3 CiuM. L. F.
85, 86 (1991) (noting that dispute between United States and Noriega "may be the first
of many cases raising difficult questions of international law and policy with regard to
the payment of attorney fees."). See also Eugene R. Gaetke and Sarah N. Welling, Money
Laundering and Lauyers, 43 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1165 (1992) (discussing collective impact
of domestic money laundering laws on criminal defense bar).
15. F. Lee Bailey Freed From Jail, supra note 14, at A12.
16. Id.
17. See U.S. v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611 (1989) (finding that attorney's fees are
not exempt from forfeiture); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. U.S., 491 U.S. 617, 632
(1989) (holding that there is no sixth amendment right to exclude attorney's fees from
forfeiture).
18. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 600; Caplin, 491 U.S. at 617.
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cused when those assets are proven to be the product of criminal
activity. 19 The Court concluded that statutory language and
compelling governmental purposes in adoption of the legisla-
tion justified forfeiture;20 the justices held that attorneys' fees
forfeiture violates neither the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
nor the Fifth Amendment due process clause.21 The U.S. stat-
ute, dealing with continuing criminal enterprises22 ("CCEs"), re-
quires that "any property constituting, or derived from... pro-
ceeds ... obtained"23 from certain drug-related offenses be for-
feited to the federal government. 24 In one of the twin decsions,
U.S. v. Monsanto, the Court interpreted this statutory language
narrowly and literally.25 The Court found the statutory language
of the CCEs statute to be unambiguous. 6 Congress' failure to
include an exemption for attorneys' fees, according to the
Court's slim majority,27 was intentional in light of the use of the
term "any property"28 when referring to assets subject to forfei-
ture.29
At about the same time as these twin decisions, the interna-
tional community was completing work on two new treaties
which would raise the same issues relating to forfeiture and at-
19. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 611 (1989); Caplin, 491 U.S. at 632.
20. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 633.
21. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614 ("we hold that neither the Fifth nor the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution requires Congress to permit a defendant to use assets
adjudged to be forfeitable to pay that defendant's legal fees."); Caplin, 491 U.S. at 619
(holding statute that does not provide exception to forfeiture for attorney's fees to be
constitutional).
22. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1986) deals with continuing criminal enterprises ("CCEs").
Section 853(a), when discussing property subject to criminal forfeiture, states:
[any person convicted of a violation of this title or title III punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year shall forfeit to the United States, irre-
spective of any provision of State law any property constituting, or derived
from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of
such violation ....
21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1986).
23. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (1986).
24. Id.
25. See Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 607 (concluding that "the statute is unambiguous in
failing to exclude assets that could be used to pay an attorney from its definition of
forfeitable property.").
26. Id.
27. Id. (noting that 5-4 majority decided this case).
28. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (detailing provisions of § 853(a), the
CCE statute).
29. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 607.
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torneys' fees. These two instruments were the 1988 United Na-
tions Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances30 ("U.N. Narcotic Drugs Convention")
and the 1990 Council of Europe's Convention on Laundering,
Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime3 '
("Laundering Convention"). Neither instrument, on its face, re-
solves the question of whether attorneys' fees are among the seiz-
able assets gained from criminal conduct. Arguably, the exemp-
tion language of both conventions, as well as strong supporting
commentary, implies the inclusion of defense attorneys among
exempted third parties. 32 This conclusion seems all the more
true when the language of the two conventions is compared with
that of the U.S. CCEs statute and its strict interpretation by the
Supreme Court.3
30. The United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and
Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, art. 6, 3, 28 I.L.M. 493, 507 (1989) [hereinafter
U.N. Narcotic Drugs Convention]. At the signing ceremony of the United Nations Con-
vention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ("U.N.
Narcotic Drugs Convention") in December of 1988, signatory countries included Can-
ada, Denmark, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States and Yugo-
slavia. The United States has since become a party.
31. Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds
from Crime, Nov. 8,1990, Europ. T.S. No. 141, 30 I.L.M. 148 (1991) [hereinafter Laun-
dering Convention]. Signatories to Laundering Convention included Belgium, Cyprus,
Denmark, F.R.G., Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom.
32. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 87 (concluding that "the exemption language of
both the UN Drug Convention and the Laundering Convention excludes defense attor-
ney fees from seizure."). The U.N. Narcotics Convention states, in Article 5.8, that the
confiscation provisions "shall not be construed as prejudicing the rights of bona fide
third parties." U.N. Narcotic Drugs Convention, supra note 30, art. 5.8, 28 I.L.M. 493,
507. If attorneys, who are not mentioned by name, are such parties, it seems clear that
their right to fees is protected. Article 5 of the Laundering Convention protects legal
remedies for "interested parties," who are to be guaranteed "effective legal remedies in
order to preserve their rights." Laundering Convention, supra note 31, Europ. T.S. No.
141, 30 I.L.M. 148, 152. The Explanatory Report to the Convention makes clear that the
experts agree that the document cannot be read to "make it criminal to hire a lawyer or
to accept a fee." Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Convention on Laun-
dering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime add. II, point 33
(1990) [hereinafter Explanatory Report]. Curiously, however, the Convention itself
does not clearly address the issue.
33. The exemption language in the U.S. CCEs statute is not nearly as clear as that
of the conventions. The CCEs statute states that property "may be the subject of a
special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited" unless the third
party satisfies certain requirements for exemption. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). Moreover, the
legislative history of the U.S. CCEs statute is not as clear as the express statements of the
Explanatory Report to the Laundering Convention. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 92-93
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To the extent that there is any ambiguity on the face of the
two international conventions, there are also strong arguments
against the seizure of attorneys' fees by the use of international
human rights law and principles.3" For example, in Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. U.S., the U.S. Supreme Court rejected an
argument that the U.S. CCEs statute caused deprivation of Fifth
Amendment due process of law because the CCE statute upsets
the "balance of forces between the accused and his accuser."35
The Court rejected this argument as speculative, holding that
the possibility of prosecutorial abuse of process was not enough
to require the facial invalidity of the CCE statute.36 This rejected
argument would almost certainly prevail under the European
system of human rights protection, where integral to it is a fair
and public trial by an independent and impartial tribunal.
Moreover, while the U.S. Constitution contains no explicit guar-
antee of the presumption of innocence, this presumption is ex-
plicitly guaranteed in such international instruments as the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, 3 the ICCPR,3 9 the Copen-
hagen Document on Human Rights,' ° the American Declaration
on the Rights and Duties of Man,4" and the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 42 The pre-
(comparing statements of U.S. CCE statute and Explanatory Report to Laundering
Convention).
34. See Wilson, supra note 14, at 92-93 (providing fuller discussion of use of inter-
national human rights instruments and mechanisms).
35. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 634.
36. Id.
37. See P. VAN DUK and GJ.H. vAN HooF, THEORY AND PRAcrIcE or THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HumAN RIGHTS, 251 (1984) (discussing European system of human
rights protection); Wilson, supra note 14, at 100-03 (detailing case law relating to Euro-
pean system of human rights protection).
38. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 18, G.A_ Res. 217 A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
39. ICCPR supra note 4, art. 14, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, 6 I.L.M. at 376.
40. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Document of the Copen-
hagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension,June 29, 1990, reprinted in
29 I.L.M. 1305, art. 5.19 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Document]. The Copenha-
gen Document is part of a series of treaties adopted by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe ("OSCE"). The organization was recently renamed. Its
former name was the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE").
41. O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
States, art. III, in 1 Annals Organization Am. Sts. 130, 130 (1949).
42. European Convention, supra note 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No. 5. No-
tably, the United States participated in these treaties and is a signatory to many of them,
including the Copenhagen Document, the American Declaration on the Rights and
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sumption of innocence seems a meaningless sham if the govern-
ment intervenes denying the defense access to counsel of its
choice. Finally, the Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers43
("Principles"), adopted by the Eighth U.N. Congress on the Pre-
vention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders in 1990,"1 pro-
vides in Article 16 that "Governments shall ensure that lawyers
... shall not suffer, or be threatened with, prosecution or admin-
istrative, economic or other sanctions for any action taken in ac-
cordance with recognized professional duties, standards and eth-
ics."4 5 The forcible seizure of attorneys' fees by a government is
surely an economic sanction under Article 16 and thus is in vio-
lation of the Article's principles.
A European expert has noted that the notion of seizure of
attorneys' fees is alien in Europe.' The same expert asserted
that if the issue were to reach the European Court of Human
Rights, the Court would strike down such a forfeiture as a viola-
tion of the presumption of innocence. 47 The notion of forfeiture
of attorneys' fees also seemed alien in the United States before it
became the law of the land in 1989.48 The international law on
Duties of Man. The United States signed the founding document of the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man as a member of the Organization of Amer-
ican States. While the signatories originally intended the declaration to be an aspira-
tional statement for the hemisphere, there is now a body ofjurisprudence that holds it
to have become binding international law in the region. See Advisory Opinion OC-10/
89, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within
the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (1989), at paras. 45, 47; Case 9647 (United States),
Res. 3/87 (27 March 1987) in 1986-1987 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COM-
MISSION ON HuMAN RIGHTS, OEA/Ser. L/L/V/II.71, doc. 9, rev. 1 (22 September
1987), at 147; Thomas Buergenthal, The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human
Rights, 69 AM.J. INT'L L. 828 (1975).
43. Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Lega! Developments: The Fortification of an Emergency Regime,
59 ALB. L. REv. 1353, n.129 (1996) (noting that Eighth U.N. Conference on Prevention
of Crime and Treatment of Offenders in August-September, 1990 adopted these princi-
ples).
44. United Nations, Report of the Eighth United States Congress on the Preven-
tion of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, 27 August - September
1990, A/CONF.144/28 (Oct. 5, 1990).
45. Id.
46. Bruce Zagaris, ABA National Institute Considers International and Foreign Law As-
pects of Asset Forfeiture, 6 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. RPTR. 435,438 (1990) (containing Obser-
vations of Hans Nilsson, Administrator of the Directorate of Legal Affairs, Division of
Crime Problems, Council of Europe).
47. Id. at 438.
48. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing twin decisions that held
forfeiture of attorneys' fees to be constitutional).
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attorneys' fees seizure is not yet settled, and the defense bar
must be vigilant in assuring that the U.S. experience continues
to be the exception, rather than the rule in the international
community.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, THE DEATH PENALTY
AND THE DEATH ROW PHENOMENON
The death penalty and the death row phenomenon 49 add
another dimension to international humans rights law. Ameri-
can University's International Human Rights Law Clinic has
been active in several cases challenging the imposition of the
death penalty in the United States under international human
rights law. It has three cases pending before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights,"° all arising from murder convic-
tions in the United States for which the courts sentenced to
death the defendants, all African-American men. The three
cases involve William Andrews, who Utah officials executed for
committing capital murder;5 1 Gary Graham, who awaits execu-
tion in Texas;5  and Calvin Burdine, also on death row in
Texas.5 3 In two other U.S. cases, the Clinic filed briefs amicus
curiae in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces. The
49. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing that court held that death
row phenomenon of prolonged delay awaiting execution under difficult conditions of
confinement violated international human rights law).
50. See American Convention for Human Rights, Opened for Signature Nov. 22,
1969, Chs. VII-VIII, OAS.T.S. No. 36, at 11-19, 9 I.L.M. 673, 685-93 (1970) (entered
into force July 18, 1978) (providing for the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights); Zagaris, supra note 11, at 1897 (positing that Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights serves "to safeguard the implementation of the rights set forth in the
Convention").
51. See Richard Wilson, Race, CriminalJustice and the Death Penalty, 15 WH=I-TIER L.
Rv. 395 (1994) (providing extensive review of procedural history of Andrews case).
52. See id. (providing extensive review of procedural history of Graham case).
53. Case No. 11.423, Petition Alleging Violations of the Human Rights of Calvin
Jerrod Burdine by the United States of America and the State of Texas, submitted Jan.
11, 1995. Brent E. Newton, of the Texas Resource Center in Houston, Texas, serves as
counsel for the petitioner in domestic proceedings and appears as co-counsel on the
petition. The Commission issued Precautionary Measures under Article 29.2 of its Reg-
ulations on Jan, 13, 1995. Such measures are available ex parte to avoid "irreparable
damage to persons." In a related matter, the Clinic also submitted an amius curiae brief
in the Texas federal district court, where Mr. Burdine had filed a successor habeas
corpus petition. The Clinic's brief argued that the federal courts were bound by inter-
national human rights norms regarding torture and that the precautionary measures of
the Commission were binding on the domestic courts. Burdine v. Scott, Amicus Curiae
Brief of the International Human Rights Law Clinic in Support of Petitioner, Civ. Ac-
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Clinic filed one on behalf of James Murphy, who the Govern-
ment convicted of the murder of three people while stationed in
Germany.54 The Clinic filed the other on behalf of Herbert
Smulls, whose appeal was recently decided by the Missouri
Supreme Court.5 5 Each of these cases presents distinct aspects
of the application of international human rights law.
In the Inter-American Commission, the case involving Wil-
liam Andrews has proceeded the furthest. In an extensive writ-
ten decision, the Commission, finding the petition to be admissi-
ble, proceeded to the merits of the case.56 Oral arguments were
held on the merits in February 1996 and a decision is pending.
Mr. 'Andrews, a black soldier, asserts that he was the victim of
racial discrimination in the application of the death penalty to
him. He further contends that his eighteen year wait on death
row was a violation of the death row phenomenon first con-
demned in Soering v. United Kingdom, a well-known decision of
the European Court of Human Rights.57 In Soerring, the Court
held that Great Britain would violate the European Convention
on Human Rights if it extradited Jens Soering to the United
States to face murder charges and a potential death sentence in
the state of Virginia.58 The Court found that the death row phe-
nomenon of prolonged delay awaiting execution under difficult
conditions of confinement, violated Article 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, which protects against "inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment."59
tion No. H-94-4190, U.S.D.C., S. Dist. of Texas, filed April 10, 1995. The litigation is still
pending in that court.
54. United States v. Murphy, Brief Amicwus Curiae of the International Human
Rights Law Clinic in Support of the Appellant, Docket No. 64,926/AR, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces, submitted May 4, 1995. A student from the Clinic orally
argued the amicus position in May, 1997. The litigation is pending as of this writing.
55. State v. Smulls, Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Herbert Smulls, No. 75511
(S.C. Mo.), filed May 17, 1995. Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, in Minneapo-
lis, Minnesota appeared as co-counsel on the brief, and Professor Robert Popper of the
School of Law, University of Missouri, Kansas City, appeared of counsel.
56. Case 11.139, Report No. 3/95, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.88 Doc. 15 (Feb. 16, 1995).
57. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), 28 I.L.M.
1063 (1989) (holding that "death row phenomenon" of prolonged delay awaiting exe-
cution while under difficult conditions of confinement violated international human
rights law).
58. Id.
59. Id.; European Convention, supra note 1, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S.
No. 5. The United States was so concerned about its potential liability for violations of
Soering that it included an express reservation to Article 7 of both the Torture Conven-
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Andrews' racial prejudice claim asserts that an incident at
trial, never reviewed on the merits in any domestic court, so in-
fected the verdict as to render the decision a nullity. The inci-
dent occurred at Andrews' trial when the bailiff, after receiving a
note from a juror, notified the trial judge. The note, allegedly
found in the jury room, stated "Hang the Niggers," accompanied
by a crude, black stick-figure hanged from a noose.60 Despite
the defense counsel's objection and request to sequester the
jury, the judge simply admonished the jury not to let the note
influence them.61 The Smulls litigation in Missouri, in which we
filed a brief amicus curiae,62 raised a related question as the facts
show a pattern of racial prejudice in the selection of the jury
which sentenced Smulls to death.63 While the Missouri Supreme
Court's en banc split decision did not mention the brief or the
international law issues, the case was remanded for a new post
conviction hearing before a different judge, where racial preju-
dice by the trial court was sufficiently demonstrated.
The Graham case64 raises the question of the propriety of
the U.S. rule announced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Herrera v.
Collins that, even with the imposition of the death penalty, a state
court under state law may constitutionally preclude a claim of
innocence from collateral review.65 The Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights tabled Graham's case on its docket
when, in response to the intense scrutiny of the international
community, the Texas courts granted Mr. Graham review of his
well-documented claim of innocence.66 The Burdine litigation67
raises another question of great international import, the use of
fion and the ICCPR, limiting the meaning of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment" in the latter to the meaning of cruel and unusual punishment under
the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. David P.
Stewart, US. Ratfication of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Significance of the
Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 14 HUM. RTS. L.J. 77 (1993).
60. Case 11.139, Report No. 3/95, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.88 Doc. 15 (Feb. 16, 1995).
61. Id. at 17-18.
62. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing brief filed on behalf of
Smulls).
63. State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d 9 (S.C. Mo. 1996).
64. See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing Graham case and his
awaiting execution in Texas).
65. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
66. See Richard Wilson, Race, Criminal Justice and the Death Penalty, 15 WHrrrIER L.
REv. 395 (1994) (providing extensive review of procedural histories of Andrews and
Graham cases, including updates of cases).
67. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing Burdine litigation).
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psychological torture while the defendant awaits execution. Mr.
Burdine was twice put through the process of isolation and prep-
aration for execution when Texas prison officials were aware
that the courts had stayed his execution. The Burdine case also
raises the death row phenomenon issue. The U.S. Supreme
Court gave this issue a boost when it stayed the execution of
Clarence Lackey, also on death row in Texas, to permit review of
that issue by the lower courts.' 8 For that reason and others, the
Burdine petition has been tabled at the Commission pending
exhaustion of domestic remedies.
The Murphy litigation also raises an interesting question
under international human rights law.69 A U.S. military court
martial convicted Murphy of the murder of his German wife and
two children in German territory.7" Murphy's case is one of the
first to apply new provisions of military law which permit the im-
position of the death penalty for certain murders.71 The NATO
Status of Forces Treaty between Germany and the United States
governed jurisdiction in the matter.72 The German Govern-
ment, which opposes the use of the death penalty at the national
level, sought assurances that Murphy would not be subjected to
the death penalty, and has been told that the chances that an
execution would be carried forward are remote, yet under the
terms of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement ("SOFA") treaty,
German law permits a local prosecutor to surrender jurisdiction
to the United States, which the local prosecutor did in this
case.7" The case, now pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces, raises interesting jurisdictional questions
addressed in the brief, including the nature of obligations at sur-
render for trial under NATO-SOFA, where the defendant faces
68. Lackey v. Texas, 115 S.Ct. 1421 (1995) ("[tlhough the importance and novelty
of the question presented.., are sufficient to warrant review by this Court, those factors
also provide a principled basis for postponing consideration of the issue until after it
has been addressed by other courts.").
69. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing Murphy litigation).
70. Appellate decisions reporting the procedural history of this case are United
States v. Murphy, 30 MJ. 1040 (A.C.M.R. en bane 1990); Murphy v. Judges of the Army
Ct. of Military Rev., 34 MJ. 310 (C.MA 1992).
71. The current death penalty statute for murders committed while the defendant
is a member of the armed forces is 10 U.S.C. § 918 (1988).
72. The Status-of-Forces Treaty, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2486.
73. See U.S. Department of State, correspondence of George P. Shultz, Sec. of
State, and Hans Dietrich Genschew, German Foreign Minister, Sept. 1988 (on file with
the Fordham International Law Journal).
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possible punishment.74 The amicus curiae brief we filed also ar-
gued that Murphy, a black man, suffered violations of the ICCPR
and the Race Convention. The brief also contended that Mur-
phy's execution would violate an emerging international custom-
ary norm that prohibits state-sponsored killing of an individual
who commits murder in an abolitionist country, here Germany.
This case presents the anomalous situation of a German Federal
Government being opposed to the execution but unable to for-
mally appear in the matter, having surrendered jurisdiction
under the treaty.
Another interesting development in the use of international
human rights law in the application of the death penalty is the
recent trend toward limiting certain methods of execution due
to the method being cruel or inhuman. The case of Ng v. Can-
ada, where Mr. Ng faced the death penalty if extradited from
Canada to California, exemplifies this trend.75  In Ng, the
Human Rights Committee, relying on the Soering principles re-
garding state responsibility, found that extradition of Mr. Ng
would violate Article 7 of the ICCPR, in that death by cyanide gas
asphyxiation is cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and
punishment. 76 More recently, in February 1996, the Ninth Cir-
cuit U.S. Court of Appeals found the use of lethal gas for execu-
tion in California violated the U.S. Constitution's Eighth Amend-
ment, which prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. 77
The United States finds itself increasingly isolated in the in-
ternational community in its continued enthusiastic use of the
death penalty at both the state and federal levels. The U.S. Gov-
ernment's ongoing actions put it, with each passing day, further
from compliance with the evolving norms of international
human rights law that point towards abolition. Hopefully, the
litigation described above will be part of the bricks and mortar of
an evolving jurisprudence in international law which eventually
74. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing Murphy litigation and
noting case is still pending).
75. Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, decision of 5 Nov. 1993, 15
HUM. RTS. L.J. 149 (1994).
76. Id.
77. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII ("[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."). Fierro v. Gomez,
77 F.3d 301 (9th Cir. 1996).
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results in the abolition of capital punishment in the United
States.
III. UNIVERSAL CONCEPTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS WEAKEN
THE RULE OF NON-INQUIRY IN EXTRADITION
Another area in which international human rights law will
continue to play a strong role is that of extradition. In June of
1995, the Mexican Government requested the extradition of for-
mer Deputy Attorney General Mario Ruiz Massieu, whom the
Government accused of engaging in a cover-up in the investiga-
tion of the assassination of his own brother, a top official in Mex-
ico's ruling party.7" The judge in the case, a federal magistrate
sitting in Newark, New Jersey, denied the extradition request,
ruling that witness statements taken in Mexico were "incredible
and unreliable,"7 9 because they were taken in a country which
was infected with "massive corruption"8 ° growing out of the co-
caine-smuggling trade, and that Mexico "has admittedly prac-
ticed torture in the questioning of suspects."8 The magistrate
also suggested that the witnesses did not have counsel present
when their statements were given." The magistrate invoked the
practice of judicial inquiry into the protection of human rights
in the legal system of the receiving state, here Mexico, and ex-
panded on a growing international trend in abandonment of the
rule of non-inquiry. 3
The International Human Rights Law Clinic handled a case
involving the application of the rule of non-inquiry, Calum Ian
Innes v. United States.84 This case involved the extradition of Mr.
Innes from the United States to France, where he had been con-
victed in absentia in 1982 of various offenses having to do with
importation of illegal drugs, smuggling, and fraudulent profits.
78. See Robert L.Jackson &Juanita Darling, U.S. Judge Won't Extradite Former Mexico
Official, LA TIMES, June 23, 1995, at Al (discussing Mexico's ruling parties actions with
reference to Massieu).
79. See id. (detailing judge's comments concerning case).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing rule of non-inquiry and
defining it as where extradition law has traditionally blocked judicial inquiry into fair-
ness of judicial procedures and penal conditions of requesting country).
84. Innes v. U.S., No. 93-5112, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 22691 (5th Cir. Aug. 5,
1994).
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French authorities commenced the extradition process by filing
a complaint, in December 1992, in the Western District of Loui-
siana, where Mr. Innes was serving time on a federal conviction.
A federal magistrate certified Mr. Innes as extraditable and Mr.
Innes filed a timely petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. The Court
denied the writ in June 1993. After the District Court denied the
appointment of counsel, Mr. Innes filed a pro se appeal notice.
The Clinic was approached to undertake his appeal on a pro bono
basis on August 23, 1993. The same day, unknown to the Clinic,
the Secretary of State signed a warrant for the transfer of Mr.
Innes to France. On August 27, 1993, Mr. Innes was moved to
France. Not knowing the exact whereabouts of its client, the
Clinic entered an appearance on August 31 and sought an emer-
gency stay of removal or, in the alternative, Mr. Innes' return to
the United States. The Court denied the motion as moot, but
did not dismiss the appeal. Following full briefing and oral argu-
ment of the case, a short memorandum decision dismissed the
appeal as moot in August 1994.
The Innes appeal raised two principal questions: first,
whether the executive branch, knowing of his pending appeal,
violated court rules and separation of powers by intentionally re-
moving him from the jurisdiction; and second, whether the 1982
French trials in absentia, even with the French government's
guarantee of trials de novo, could meet the minimal standards of
international human rights norms that the United States and
France accept by virtue of their common ratification of the
ICCPR, which requires in Article 14(3) (d) that the defendant be
tried "in his presence."8" The second issue is the focus of this
section.8 6
85. ICCPR, supra note 4, art, 14(3) (d), 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, 6 I.L.M. at 376.
86. The first issue also raises fascinating issues of international law beyond the
scope of this article. The practice of removal of the extraditee during the pendancy of
appeal is apparently on the rise. We were aware of a number of such cases in addition
to our own. In no case, to our knowledge, did the court intervene to return the ex-
traditee; all courts dismissed the appeal as moot. While a stay order barring removal
may protect the appellant, many defendants are unrepresented by counsel and unaware
of the risk of not seeking a stay. We did make the argument that another U.S. Court of
Appeals had used the All Writs Act to order the return ofJohn Demjanjuk, alleged to
be "Ivan the Terrible," a notorious guard at Treblinka, from Israel when he had been
deported improperly from the United States. The case is an unreported bench ruling.
Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, No. 85-3435, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 20596 (6th Cir. 1993).
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The rule of non-inquiry is a basic component in the regime
of extradition of many North American and European countries.
It asserts that the sending country will not look behind the re-
ceiving country's request for extradition because such inquiry is
an invasion of the requesting country's sovereignty and a viola-
tion of international principles of comity. Thus, neither the
criminal processes to which the defendant will be subjected nor
the conditions of confinement in the receiving country are rele-
vant factors for consideration by the reviewing authority in the
sending state. This rule, devised at the turn of the century in the
United States and well-established in much of Europe, should be
abandoned. Judicial inquiry should be permitted so long as
both the sending and receiving states are parties to international
human rights instruments which define the countries' common
acceptance of binding principles of international human rights
in the criminal process. In the absence of acceptance by the re-
ceiving country of basic human rights norms through treaty rati-
fication, the sending country should apply acknowledged princi-
ples of international law to the recognition of human rights obli-
gations which are binding on the receiving country as a matter
of customary international law.
In the United States, the rule of non-inquiry was developed
judicially in 1901 in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Neely v.
Henkel. 7 The Court rejected a contention by the extraditee that,
if surrendered to Cuba, he would not be tried under procedures
which conformed to guarantees found in the U.S. Constitution.
The Court held that the safeguards of the U.S. legal system, and
in particular its criminal procedures, are inapplicable to crimes
committed in foreign jurisdictions."8 Other rationales have de-
veloped, in the United States and abroad, to justify the use of the
rule of non-inquiry. 9 In general, these include assertions that
court review of decisions on the operation of overseas legal sys-
tems would involve the courts in foreign affairs.9" This argument
is expressed through the political question doctrine, under
which the courts may decline consideration of issues which are
assigned to the political branches of government. Another argu-
87. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
88. Id. at 123.
89. See Shea, supra note 7, at 93 (discussing arguments justifying rule of non-in-
quiry).
90. Id.
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ment is that courts lack the investigative machinery to verify
claims of alleged abuses of human rights in foreign legal sys-
tems.9 ' Still another argument is that review of the legal systems
of states with differing ideologies allows notorious criminals to
escape punishment.9 2 None of these reasons, including those
originally offered in Neely,93 can withstand scrutiny in the face of
the developing law of international human rights.
The premises underlying the Neely decision have been un-
dermined with the passage of time. There, the person being ex-
tradited argued that the Cuban legal system failed to conform
with the requirements of the U.S. Constitution.94 No argument
was offered that the country's legal system could not measure up
against a universally accepted international human rights stan-
dard because such standards did not formally evolve until after
World War II. Understandably, the Court was reluctant to ex-
tend U.S. constitutional guarantees to another country. More-
over, the person to be extradited had no real case or controversy
alleging actual violation of his rights by the Cuban legal system,
nor did he offer proof about how the Cuban legal system was
likely to treat him. He offered only general allegations that the
Cuban legal system did not provide habeas corpus protection,
prohibition of ex post facto laws, or jury trial.95 He did not offer
proof as to how he had been or might be affected by such fail-
ures in Cuban law.96 Today, such proof is easily available
through extensive human rights reporting by both domestic and
international monitors or through expert testimony. In the con-
text of political asylum claims, for example, the Cuban legal sys-
tem routinely comes under close scrutiny and has been held to
violate the human rights norms inherent in the law of political
asylum 97
Asylum judges make findings of fact and law about the qual-
ity of justice, often basing their findings on the extensive and
detailed annual reports on human rights country conditions pre-
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing Neely).
94. Neely, 180 U.S. at 114-15,
95. Id.
96. Id. at 122.
97. See, e.g., Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, No. A-23220644, Int. Dec. 3222, 1990 BIA
Lexis 23 (Board of Immigration Appeals 1990) (granting withholding of deportation to
gay Cuban because he could not find adequate protection in Cuban legal system).
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pared by the U.S. State Department, now considered a model of
accuracy and fairness.9" There is little evidence that the execu-
tive branch is any more capable of exercising the fact-finding
function than the judicial branch and some evidence to demon-
strate the contrary. In the United States, for example, the Exec-
utive has negotiated extradition treaties with many countries
whose governments have since changed to repressive regimes.
While the State Department reserves the right to terminate an
extradition treaty where fundamental fairness cannot be pre-
served, the United States has never done so in its history.9
Perhaps the most difficult issue to deal with in this area is
that of an appropriate remedy. It is often asserted that a deci-
sion not to grant a petition for extradition because of close judi-
cial inquiry will make the sending country a haven for interna-
tional criminals because the only effective remedy in such situa-
tions is the release of the defendant from custody.100 While this
is often offered as a theoretical problem, it has never actually
occurred. Perhaps the best example is the case involving Jens
Soering in the European human rights system.'0 1 In fact, de-
spite the difficulty in dealing with a state government through
the U.S. State Department, prosecutors in Virginia eventually re-
lented on their pursuit of the death penalty and assured British
authorities that they would not seek capital punishment. Soer-
ing was extradited, convicted of murder, and sentenced to life
without parole.' The requirement that assurances be given
98. This has not always been true. In the years of the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions, during which the State Department's country reports became extremely
politicized, human rights organizations published an annual "critique" of the reports,
arguing their factual inaccuracy and errors, and adding information relevant to human
rights concerns. The need for such correction, in itself, argues for removal of the fact-
finding function to the judicial branch.
99. See Lauren Sara Wolfe, Gill & Sandhu v. Imundi: Due Process andJudicial Inquiry
into Potential Mistreatment of Extraditees by Requesting Countries, 13 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 1009, 1029 (1991) (noting that United States has never terminated extradition
treaty).
100. Id. at 1037.
101. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussingJens Soering).
102. Ralph G. Steinhardt, Recent Developments in the Soering Litigation, 11 HUM. RTS.
L. J. 453, 454 (1990). See Richard B. Lillich, The Soering Case, 85 AMJ. INT'L L. 128
(1991) (providing full discussion of Soering Case);John B. Quigley and S. Adele Shank,
Death Row as a Vwlation of Human Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to Virginia?, 30 VIRG. J.
INT'L L. 241 (1989) (discussing Soering Case); Colin Warbick, Coherence and the European
Court of Human Rights: The Adjudicative Background of the Soering Case, 11 MIcH. J. INT'L L.
1073, 1078-80, 1090-95 (1990) (criticizing Soering decision as overreaching by Court).
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before the sending state surrenders the individual to be extra-
dited goes a long way toward resolution of the problem of safe
haven. 10 3
U.S. and Commonwealth Courts have shown increasing in-
terest in abandonment of the rule of non-inquiry. A series of
decisions in the United States uses the standard set out in the
early decision of Gallina v. Fraser, where the court observed that
judicial inquiry is appropriate when "the relator, upon extradi-
tion, would be subject to procedures or punishment so antipa-
thetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require [the rule
of non-inquiry's] reexamination."0 4 Similar trends are discern-
103. A more difficult problem, in my view, is that of the consequences of the re-
ceiving government's failure to fulfill its assurances. A recent example from my own
practice is relevant here. In 1994, I was contacted by U.S. lawyers working for Joseph
Kindler, an American who escaped to Canada following his conviction for murder and
death sentence in Pennsylvania in 1983. Kindler was extradited from Canada in a case
which drew international attention. Shea, supra note 7, at 114-119. The Human Rights
Committee, in a divided decision, found that Kindler's extradition from Canada to face
the death penalty would not violate Article 7 of the ICCPR because Kindler's facts were
distinguishable from Soering's in that counsel had not alleged poor conditions or the
effects of delay in the Pennsylvania death penalty regime and there had been no simul-
taneous request for extradition to a non-death penaltyjurisdiction as had been the case
with Germany in the Soering litigation. Kindler v. Canada, Communication No. 470/
1991, Decision of 30 July 1993, reported at 14 HUM. RTS L.J. 307 (1993). After his
extradition, Kindler's U.S. defense counsel asserted to me that his appeals in the U.S.
legal system were given short shrift by the courts, generally on grounds of procedural
bar, waiver, and collateral estoppel. His lawyers inquired whether there was any re-
course for this failure to provide fundamental due process, which they felt had been
part of the basis for the Canadian executive branch and courts' willingness to return
Kindler to the United States. The Canadian government itself expressed some interest
in intervention in the appellate process but had no means, other than by diplomatic
channels, to intervene in the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. On consultation with col-
leagues, our conclusion was that there is no legal basis, and no legal precedent, for
intervention in the proceedings based on breach of promise by the receiving state. Our
conclusion was that Kindler had only diplomatic, not judicial, recourse.
104. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851
(1960). The GaUina Court's reasoning has been questioned more recently in the ap-
peal from a well-reasoned decision granting extradition to Israel, but, using the reason-
ing of the Soering decision, observing that a court which extradites to a state that violates
human rights makes the court a party to the violation. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp.
389, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), affd, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990). An interesting case is the
January 1996 decision of a federal district court judge in Sidali v. INS. See Sidali v. INS,
914 F. Supp. 1104 (N.J. 1996). There, the court refused extradition and granted habeas
corpus relief, finding that the government had not established probable cause to be-
lieve that the petitioner had committed a crime in Turkey, although the highest review-
ing court of that country had upheld his conviction for rape and murder there. The
judge provides an excellent analysis of what, to Western legal systems, seems an arcane
criminal procedure in Turkey, noting that the petitioner was acquitted by two separate
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able in Canada and the United Kingdom.1"'
Perhaps the Gallina standard is too strict. A better standard
for qualification of the rule of non-inquiry can be found in the
statutory language of the Supplementary Extradition Treaty be-
tween the United States and the United Kingdom 116 ("Supple-
mentary Treaty"). The Supplementary Treaty, in Article 3(a),
prohibits extradition "if the person sought establishes.., by a
preponderance of the evidence that... he would, if surrendered,
be prejudiced at his trial or punished, detained or restricted in
his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or
political opinions."" 7 This language, taken in part from the in-
ternational standard for the establishment of a claim of political
asylum, provides a statutory abrogation of the rule of non-in-
quiry coupled with a reasonable standard of proof, preponder-
ance of the evidence, for establishment of the claim. Moreover,
unlike the traditional, unappealable extradition inquiry before a
federal magistrate, the Supplementary Treaty stipulates, in Arti-
cle 3(b), that decisions by the magistrate are immediately ap-
pealable by either party to the federal district court or court of
trial courts before his conviction was upheld on appeal by the prosecution to a review-
ing tribunal which reexamined both the factual and legal sufficiency of the lower
courts' decisions to acquit. SeeJohn B. Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of
Human Rights on Extradition Law, 15 N.C.J. Irr'L L. & COM. REG. 401 (1990) (providing
excellent compilation of decisions which erode rule of non-inquiry); David B. Sullivan,
Abandoning the Rule of Non-Inquiy in International Extradition, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 111 (1992) (discussing cases eroding rule of non-inquiry).
105. See Shea, supra note 7, at 113-119 (discussing Canadian and U.K. cases related
to rule of non-inquiry).
106. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.IR, 24 I.L.M. 1105
[hereinafter Supplementary Treaty].
107. Id. art. 3(a), 24 I.L.M. 1105, 1106-07. This language is similar to that found in
Article 3(2) of the European Convention on Extradition, which provides that extradi-
tion shall not be granted
if the requesting Party has substantial grounds for believing that a request for
extradition for an ordinary criminal offense has been made for the purpose of
prosecuting or punishing a person on account of his race, religion, nationality
or political opinion, or that the person's position may be prejudiced for any of
these reasons.
European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957, art. 3(2), 359 U.N.T.S. 173, 178,
Europ. T.S. No. 24, at 3. See MICHAEL ABBELL AND BRUNO RISTOW, INTERNATIONAL JUDI-
CIAL ASSISTANCE, VOL. 4, CRIMINAL: EXTRADITION 108-109, 211-212, A-47 (1990) (noting
that there are also similarities with U.N. Model Extradition Code and that the United
States "strenuously resisted" such language before it ultimately agreed to some version
of it in treaties with three countries, Ireland in 1984, Jamaica in 1983, and the Uniked
Kingdom here).
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appeals, as appropriate." 8 This Congressionally established
standard for abrogation of the rule of non-inquiry makes the ju-
diciary the appropriate locus for review of compliance by the re-
ceiving state with basic norms of international human rights.
Unfortunately, the limited judicial interpretations of the
Supplemental Treaty to date indicate a continued reluctance by
courts to intervene in extradition proceedings. In United States v.
Howard, the First Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals found that the
petitioner, an African-American citizen accused of a particularly
brutal murder of a white female in the United Kingdom, had not
established sufficient proof of systematic racial prejudice in Eng-
land to carry his burden of proof of particularized prejudice di-
rected toward him." 9 A more troubling decision is that of the
Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in United States v. Smyth.
There, after the District Court had refused extradition,"' the
Court of Appeals found that James Smyth, convicted of at-
tempted murder of a prison officer in Belfast, had not estab-
lished, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his potential
punishment or restrictions in Northern Ireland's Maze Prison
would be due to his affiliation with the Irish Republican Army
and not merely with his escape from prison."' The extensive
evidence offered by the petitioner, as well as the refusal of U.K.
officials to cooperate with the fact-finding efforts of the trial
108. Supplemental Treaty, supra note 106, art. 3(b), 24 I.L.M. 1105, 1106-07.
Cases and commentary on this legislatively-established exception to the rule of non-
inquiry note that it was adopted as a concession to those in the U.S. Congress who
opposed a broader effort to sharply narrow crimes designated as political under the
Supplementary Treaty. The scholarly output on the advisability of this course of action
is heated and extensive. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf, Foreign Courts on Trial: Why U.S.
Courts Should Avoid Applying the Inquiry Provision of the Supplementary US.-UK Extradition
Treaty, 25 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 257 (1988) (discussing advisability of exception to the rule
of non-inquiry); Note, Just Say No! United States Options to Extradition to the North of Ire-
land's Diplock Court System, 12 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMp. L. J. 249 (1989) (discussing op-
tions for rule of non-inquiry).
109. United States v. Howard, 996 F. 2d 1320, 1331 (1st Cir. 1993). The decision
seems justified on the record before the court, in that the petitioner offered little spe-
cific evidence as to prejudice directed toward him. The petitioner argued for a per se
rule, once evidence of prejudice was established. Id. at 1331. The reviewing court,
justifiably in this author's view, rejected that standard and the sufficiency of the proof to
establish specific prejudice directed at the petitioner. See Mary B. McDonald, Extradi-
tion Law - Supplementary Extradition Treaty Between United States and United Kingdom -
Interpreted as Partial Abrogation of the Rule of Non-Inquiry, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
391, 395-98 (1995) (discussing Howard case).
110. In Re Extradition of Smyth, 863 F. Supp. 1137, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
111. United States v. Smyth, 61 F.3d 711, 713 (9th Cir. 1995).
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judge, militate against extradition if the reviewing court were to
have applied the extensive jurisprudence of asylum law where a
well-founded fear of persecution due to political opinion ex-
ists. 112 Explicit note should be made here of the fact that both
the United States and the United Kingdom are now parties to
the Torture Convention, which states, in Article 3(1) that "[n]o
State Party shall expel, return or extradite a person to another
State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he
would be in danger of being subjected to torture."1 3 While
there is a question as to whether the potential retaliation against
Smyth would amount to torture, this explicit prohibition in in-
ternational human rights law cannot be ignored.
It is important to note that practitioners, at least in the
United States, can also use domestic constitutional provisions
such as due process of law to prevent removal from the country
or to protect against other abuses in treaties. The district court's
decision in Xiao v. Reno provides an example of the mix of do-
mestic due process and international human rights principles.114
Xiao is a horrifying account of torture by Chinese officials and
withholding of evidence by the U.S. Government. The case,
known widely as the Goldfish Case because it dealt with a con-
spiracy to import heroin into the United States inside condoms
sewn into the body cavities of dead goldfish, involved the parole
into the United States of a Chinese citizen, Wang Zong Xiao,
who was to testify for the prosecution.1 When the trial court
declared a mistrial because of evidence from Wang that he had
been tortured into confessing his own involvement in the case,
the Government sought to return Wang to China. 6 Wang filed
for political asylum." 7 The trial court entered a permanent in-
junction against the removal of Wang, holding that due process
would be violated if he were forced to return to China, given its
prior treatment of him.1 18 In another recent case, Colello v. U.S.
112. DEBORAH ANKER, THE LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES: A GUIDE TO
ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTCE AND CASE LAW 126-138 (1991).
113. Torture Convention, GA Res. 39/46, art. 3(1) (Dec. 10, 1984).
114. Xiao v. Reno, 837 F. Supp. 1506 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
115. Id. at 1513.
116. Id. at 1512.
117. Id. at 1511.
118. Id. at 1537. Notably, the District Court rejected an argument from the gov-
ernment that it was without jurisdiction because the case involved an non-justiciable
political question. Id. at 1545 et seq. It also rejected an argument by the government,
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Security and Exchange Commission, the District Court held that a
treaty which permitted the freezing of a U.S. citizen's assets in
Switzerland itself violated due process of law, in that it failed to
provide notice and an opportunity to defend through a post-
deprivation hearing.119 It also held that the treaty violated the
Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution on its face because
it allowed freezing of the assets based on reasonable suspicion,
rather than on probable cause, as is constitutionally required.1 2 0
The most adventurous of the recent court decisions, though, is
that of a federal district court in NewJersey, which, in reviewing
the authority of the U.S. Secretary of State to order deportation,
found that the unreviewable nature of that authority was an un-
constitutional delegation of powers to the executive branch of
judicial powers. 12  In this case, the Government sought the de-
portation of Mario Ruiz Massieu, whose earlier adventures with
the extradition process was discussed above. 122 The case is now
on appeal from the grant of a permanent injunction enjoining
the deportation proceeding against Ruiz Massieu. 12 3
IV. HUMAN PIGHTS PROTECTION FROM KIDNAPPING OF
THE CRIMINAL ACCUSED
Human rights protection from kidnapping of the criminal
accused is a topic of great importance and a recent U.S. court
case, United States v. Ballesteros,124 dramatically exhibits the topic.
In Ballesteros, Juan Matta Ballesteros was abducted from his home
in Tegucigalpa, Honduras near dawn on April 5, 1988.125 Four
relying on United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), that the U.S. Con-
stitution's substantive due process provisions could not extend to the extra-territorial
acts of the Chinese government, particularly when Wang was an alien on parole in the
United States. The Court distinguished Verdugo-Urquidez by noting that the govern-
ment's actions here covered a period of two years, that many were taken in the United
States, and that it was U.S. prosecutorial action alone which compelled him "to make an
unconscionable choice between telling the truth and saving his own life." Id. at 1548.
119. Colello v. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 908 F. Supp. 738, 752
(C.D. Cal. 1995).
120. Colelo, 908 F. Supp. 738, at 755.
121. Ruiz Massieu v. Reno, 915 F. Supp. 681 (N.J. 1996).
122.' See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing Massieu).
123. Massieu, 915 F. Supp. at 681. The decision finds unconstitutional 8 U.S.C.
1251 (a) (4) (C) (I), which, according to the court, had not been construed previously.
Id.
124. United States v. Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1995).
125. Id. at 761.
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U.S. Marshals, aided by Honduran Special Troops known as Co-
bras, bound his hands, put a black hood over his head, thrust
him onto the floor of a car operated by a Marshal, and drove
him to a U.S. Air Force Base nearby.1 26 Within twenty-four hours
of his abduction, he was a federal prisoner in the penitentiary at
Marion, Illinois, charged with racketeering and kidnapping of-
fenses. Reluctantly following the precedent of United States v. Al-
varez-Machain,127 the Ninth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals upheld
the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts to try Matta. 128 In an angry
concurring opinion, Judge John T. Noonan noting that the ac-
tions of the Marshals were completely outside their mandate
stated that " [w] hen an agency whose primary function is to obey
our orders, and whose functions do not include overseas abduc-
tions, undertakes to kidnap from abroad a person for produc-
tion in trial in a federal court, this action becomes our busi-
ness.1 29 He continued, "[w]e are called on to supervise cruel
conduct designed to provide us with jurisdiction."13 0 He con-
curred only because a previous federal court had tried and con-
victed the defendant, thus breaking the confinement caused by
the abduction.1 31 The facts in Ballesteros are a flagrant example
of a common practice which continues to this day in the United
States, the practice of the state-sponsored abduction or kidnap-
ping of individuals for the sole purpose of making them subject
to the jurisdiction of the federal courts of the United States.
The International Human Rights Law Clinic, with co-coun-
sel Bruce Zagaris, a Washington, D.C. private practitioner and
expert in the area of international criminal law, have filed a peti-
tion with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
challenging the practice of state-sponsored abduction as a viola-
126. Id.
127. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992). The case involves the
kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez-Machain from Mexico by agents hired by the U.S. Drug En-
forcement Agency. Dr. Machain, who was allegedly implicated in the death of a DEA
agent in Mexico, was taken from Guadalajara to El Paso, Texas, where he was tried and
convicted. The U.S. Supreme Court held that, in the absence of an explicit provision in
the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty prohibiting abduction, the practice was constitu-
tionally permissible.
128. Ballesteros, 71 F.3d at 774.
129. Id. at 775.
130. See id. ("[the accused] stands before us not as the victim of an abduction
(which he once was) but as a lawfully-held prisoner . . . [a]ccordingly, we need not
dismiss the case.").
131. Id. at 765.
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tion on international human rights law. The petition is filed on
behalf of three victims of kidnapping, Kenneth Walker, a Cana-
dian citizen, and Hossein Alikhani and George Christoforou, cit-
izens of Cyprus. The petition seeks a finding from the Commis-
sion that state-sponsored kidnapping is a violation of interna-
tional human rights law, as well as recommendations to the U.S.
Government that the convictions of the petitioners based on lack
of jurisdiction be vacated. It also calls for the Commission to
investigate and report on the practice of kidnapping by the U.S.
Customs officials involved in all cases and for fair compensation
be paid the petitioners. The petitioners have also expressed
their willingness to engage in friendly settlement discussions
with the U.S. Government.
The complaint alleges that the petitioners were victims of
the practice of what is called abduction by deceit or deception.
In both cases, U.S. Customs agents, posing as business people,
persuaded the petitioners Walker and Alikhani, respectively, to
leave their countries for business purposes. Once Walker
stopped over in the United States, and Alikhani was in a
chartered plane on the way to the alleged business site, each pe-
titioner was forcibly detained and charged with crimes in the
United States, where each stood trial and was subsequently con-
victed. Christoforou, on the other hand, remains in Cyprus with
an international arrest warrant hanging over his head and an
explicit communication from the U.S. Government that they
may forcibly abduct and subject him to U.S. criminal jurisdic-
tion. In each case, the governments of the countries involved
formally protested the actions of the U.S. Customs agents. Can-
ada protested the actions against Walker. The Bahamas, where
the U.S. Customs agents and Mr. Alikhani met and from where
they departed, and Cyprus protested the actions against Alikhani
and Christoforou. The United States has never filed formal ex-
tradition requests in any of these cases, though extradition trea-
ties exist with both countries.
The petition filed by the International Human Rights Law
Clinic and Bruce Zagaris alleges, inter alia, violations of Articles I
(Liberty and Personal Security), VIII (Freedom of Movement),
XVIII (Right to a Fair Trial), XXV (Protection from Arbitrary
Arrest), and XXVI (Due Process of Law) of the American Decla-
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ration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 32 It also argues that the
practice of state-sponsored kidnapping is a violation of interna-
tional law's jus cogens norms,1 33 a peremptory rule of interna-
tional law that prevails over any conflicting rule or agreement,
including treaties. A jus cogens norm permits no derogation and
can be modified only by a subsequent international law norm of
the same character.13 4  The Inter-American Commission has
found that a jus cogens norm exists among the member states of
the Organization of American States prescribing the execution
of children.' 3 5 Their rationale for doing so was that state-spon-
sored kidnapping of criminal suspects is so offensive to the law
of nations that it shocks the conscience of mankind. State spon-
sored abductions, thus, are jus cogens violations.' 36
To support the argument of a jus cogens violation, the peti-
tion presented several arguments. The use of kidnapping by
governments is, first of all, implicitly prohibited by the numer-
ous international human rights law prohibitions on unlawful
arrest and detention. Also, the practice of nations, particularly
in response to the decision in Alvarez-Machain in the United
States, is either to explicitly prohibit the use of state-sponsored
kidnapping by law or case decision, or, at the very least, by diplo-
matic protest when such action is taken. Finally, international
132. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
art. 12, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 5, 9 I.L.M. 673, 679 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
133. Jill M. Sheldon, Nuclear Weapons and The Laws of War: Does Customary Interna-
tional Law Prohibit The Use of Nuclear Weapons in All Circumstances?, 20 FoRDHAM INT'L L.J.
181 (noting that a "peremptory norm, also known asjus cogens, represents fundamen-
tal and compelling law, or overriding principles of international law.").
134. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United 102 com-
ment k (1987).
135. See Roach and Pinkerton v. United States, Case No. 9674 (United States),
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L/V/II.69, doc. 17 para. 54 (27 Mar. 1987), Inter-Am
C.H.R. 147, 169, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9, rev. 1 (1987) (concluding that jus cogens
norm exists among Organization of American States' members prescribing execution
of children). The Roach conclusion may be sound, but the Commission's reasoning in
reaching that conclusion has been sharply criticized. FRANK NEWMAN and DAVID WEISSB-
RODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAw, POLICY, AND PROCESS 270 (1990) (summariz-
ing these criticisms).
136. Roach states that a customary rule "achieves the status ofjus cogens precisely
because it is the kind of rule that it would shock the conscience of mankind... for a
state to protest." Roach and Pinkerton v. United States, Case No. 9674 (United States),
Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser. L/V/II.69, doc. 17 para. 54 (27 Mar. 1987), Inter-Am
C.H.R. 147, 169, OEA/ser. L./V/II.71, doc. 9, rev. 1 (1987).
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legal organizations have criticized state-sponsored abductions as
violations of international law.
Unlawful arrest and detention is prohibited by several
human rights conventions: Article 9 of the ICCPR,l1 7 Article 5
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 13 8 Article 7 of
the American Convention on Human Rights,"3 9 and Article 6 of
the African Charter on Human and People's Rights." ° In Canon
Garcia v. Ecuador, the Human Rights Committee found that Ec-
uador had violated Article 9 of the ICCPR by participating in the
kidnapping of a person to stand trial for drug trafficking of-
fenses in the United States.' The governments of Australia,
Austria, Britain, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway,
New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland have all stated that they
regard abductions as a violation of their sovereignty and would
protest the same if it happened to their nationals.142 Court deci-
sions in New Zealand, South Africa, and the United Kingdom
have reversed the state of the law in these common law coun-
tries, where physical presence of the person before the court was
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court. 4 3 Civil law juris-
dictions, such as Switzerland, have also condemned the prac-
tice. 4' Customary international law also has recognized state-
sponsored abductions as unlawful. The unlawful nature of this
137. ICCPR supra note 4, art. 9, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179, 6 I.L.M. at 376.
138. European Convention, supra note 1, art. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, Europ. T.S. No.
5.
139. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969,
art. 6, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 5, 9 I.L.M. 673, 679 (entered into force July 18, 1978).
140. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 6, 21
I.L.M. 59, 60 (1982) (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
141. Canon Garcia v. Ecuador, Decision of 11 May 1991, UN Doc. CCPR/C-43/
D319/1988.
142. See SECRETARIA DE RELACIONES EXTERIORES DE MEXICO, LIMITS ToJURISDICION
DOCUMENTS ANDJUDICIAL RESOLUTIONS ON THE ALVAREZ MACHAIN CASE 81, 90-91 (1992)
(discussing Canadian Government Amicus brief in U.S. v. Alvarez Machain); Julian J.E.
Schutte, General Report on the Regionalization of International Criminal Law and the Protection
of Human Rights in International Cooperation in Criminal Proceedings, 65 INT'L REv. PENAL
LAw 83, 122 (1994) (asserting that it is undisputed that international abduction consti-
tutes violation of international law). Julian J.E. Schutte is a high-level official in the
Dutch Ministry of Justice.
143. R v. Harley [1978] 2 NZLR 199 (NZ); S. v. Reahan 1992 (1) South African
Criminal Law Reports 307 (ZS) at 317 (Zimbabwe) (SA); R v. Horseferry Road Magis-
trates' Court, Ex parte Bennett, 3 All ER 138 (1993) (ENG).
144. See the decision of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court of 25 July 1982, EUR
GRUNDR ZErrsCHRiFr (1983) 435; 39 Swiss Yearbook of International Law 228 (1982).
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sort of conduct requires restitution of the status quo ante.14 5
The Inter-American Juridical Committee has unanimously
concluded that the United States Supreme Court decision in Al-
varez-Machain violates general principles of international law."4
In the aftermath of Alvarez-Machain, international law scholars
condemned extraterritorial abduction, including those custodial
arrests secured under false pretenses. For example, the Interna-
tional Penal Law Association Congress, at its 1994 meeting in Rio
de Janeiro, adopted the following resolution:
Abducting a person from a foreign country or enticing a per-
son under false pretenses to come voluntarily from another
country in order to subject such a person to arrest and crimi-
nal prosecution is contrary to public international law and
should not be tolerated and should be recognized as a bar to
prosecution. The victim of such a violation should have the
right to be brought into the position which existed prior to
the violation. The violation entails liability in respect of the
person concerned and the State whose sovereignty has been
violated, without prejudice to any criminal liability of the per-
sons responsible for the abduction. Similarly, procedures
such as deportation or expulsion, deliberately applied in or-
der to circumvent the safeguards of extradition procedures
should be avoided.' 4
7
In short, the weight of international legal opinion has
united in its common abhorrence of the practice of state-spon-
sored abduction, and that condemnation is sufficient to justify
the condemnation of such practice as a jus cogens violation of
international law.
The petition on behalf of all three kidnaping victims was
filed with the Commission in July of 1995. As of the date of this
writing, the Commission has not opened the case, a process
which consists of giving it a docket number and transmitting the
relevant portions of the petition to the government concerned
145. See Mexico Secretary of Foreign Relations, Limits to NationalJurisdiction, Docu-
ments and Judicial Resolutions on the Alvarez Machain Case, Vol. 1 (Mexico 1992) at 91 (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal) (discussing materials on subject of state-
sponsored abductions as unlawful).
146. Opinion of the Juridical Committee (August 15, 1992).
147. Resolutions of the XVth International Congress of Penal Law, Section IV, The
Regionalization of International Criminal Law and the Protection of Human Rights in Interna-
tional Cooperative Procedures in Criminal Matters, 66 INT'L REv. PENAL L. 67, 70, para. 19
(1995).
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for its response. The reason for this is the pursuit of additional
domestic remedies by one of the petitioners, Mr. Alikhani. All
domestic remedies must be exhausted before the petition is ad-
missible in the Commission. 148 In an effort to expedite his case,
petitioner Walker moved to sever his case from those of Chris-
taforou and Alikhani and to proceed with a request for admissi-
bility before the Commission. The request was granted.1 49
CONCLUSION
Significantly, a number of the cases mentioned above in-
volve the use of alternatives by the U.S. Government to formal
extradition. The Government proposed or used deportation in
the cases involvingJohn Demjanjuk, refered to as Ivan the Terri-
ble, and Mario Ruiz Massieu. The Government chose kidnap-
ping in the cases of Walker, Alikhani, Christaforou, and many
other cases documented in the petition. Every indication is that
the United States will continue to use these other means of ren-
dition, both legal and illegal, as an alternative to extradition.
The President, in 1995, signed into law the Omnibus
Counterterrorism Act,'5 0 which promises not only to carry for-
ward this trend toward the use of deportation in lieu of extradi-
tion, but also adopts new procedures which put the United
States further from compliance with international human rights
law. The bill creates a new tribunal which can commence pro-
ceedings against any alien, legal or illegal, without his or her
knowledge or opportunity to respond.' The court can hear ev-
idence of terrorist activity on the part of the alien and take ac-
tion to deport that person without an opportunity by the alien to
review the evidence on which the deportation is based.'52 More-
over, the bill expands the potential use of evidence obtained by
wiretapping, but denies the alien the right to either discovery of
the evidence or the right to seek its suppression if illegally ob-
148. Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, arts. 35(a)
and 37.
149. Severance of claims is also permitted by the Commission's regulations. Id. at
Article 40.
150. Omnibus Counterterrorism Act of 1995, H.R. 896, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
151. Id.
152. Id.
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tained. 53 Civil libertarians have also criticized the overly broad
definition of a terrorist organization, asserting that the bill's def-
inition could sweep in every armed resistance movement. Other
provisions of the bill dramatically curtail procedural access to
the federal writ of habeas corpus, which could further hamper
defendants on death row from effective appellate review of their
convictions. 154
In short, the catalog of U.S. violations of international
human rights law seems daunting to us as criminal defense attor-
neys and defenders of international human rights. We look to
the positive experience of Europe as a source of some solace and
look forward to the day when the United States will acknowledge
its own accountability in the community of nations for violations
of international human rights law.
153. Id.
154. See Bruce Zagaris, International Counterterrorism Act Moves Through U.S. Congress,
11 INT'L ENFORCE. L. RPTR. 193 (1995) (providing thorough review of immigration-
related aspects of Antiterrorism Act and of its changes in substantive criminal law).
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